Conviction, Self Interest or Strategy?

An interesting post from Professor Leighton Vaughan Williams on the topic of differences (of opinion) which is relevant to the recent theme on this blog of how people can have such differing views about someone or something:

Why do views differ, and how can we resolve these differences?

When two parties to a discussion differ, it is useful, in seeking to resolve the ‘argument’, to determine from where the differences arise, and whether these differences are resolvable in principle.

The reason for the difference might be that the parties to the difference have access to different evidence, or else interpret that evidence differently.

Another possibility is that one of the parties is applying a different or better process of non-evidence based reasoning to the other.

Finally, the differences might arise from each party adopting a different axiomatic starting point.

So, for example, if two parties differ in a discussion on euthanasia or abortion, or even the minimum wage, with one party strongly in favour of one side of the issue and the other strongly opposed, it is critical to establish whether this difference is evidence-based, reason-based, or derived from axiomatic differences.

We are assuming here that the stance adopted by each party on an issue is genuinely held, and is not part of a strategy designed to advance some other objective or interest. The first thing is to establish whether any amount of evidence could in principle change the mind of an advocate of a position. If not, that leads us to ask where the viewpoint comes from. Is it purely reason-based, in which case (in the sense I use the term) it should in principle be either provable or demonstrably obvious to any rational person who holds a different view, without the need to appeal to evidence.

Or else, is the viewpoint held axiomatically, so it is not refutable by appeal to reason or evidence? If the different viewpoints are held axiomatically by the parties to the difference, there the discussion should fall silent. If the differences are not held axiomatically, both parties should in principle be able to converge on agreement.

So the question reduces to establishing whether the differences arise from divergences in reasoning, which should be resolvable in principle, or else by differences in access to evidence or proper evaluation of the evidence.

Again, the latter should be resolvable in principle. In some cases, a viewpoint is held almost but not completely axiomatically. It is therefore in principle open to an appeal to evidence and/or reason.

The bar may be set so high, though, that the viewpoint is in practice axiomatically held.

If only one side to the difference holds a view axiomatically, or as close as to make it indistinguishable in practical terms, then the views could in principle converge by appeal to reason and evidence, but only converge to one side, i.e. the side which is holding the view axiomatically.

This leads to a situation in which it is in the interest of a party seeking to change the view of the other party to conceal that their viewpoint is held axiomatically, and to represent it as reason-based or evidence-based, but only where the other party is not known to also hold their divergent view axiomatically.

This leads to a game-theoretic framework where the optimal strategy, in a case where both parties know that the other party holds a view axiomatically, is to depart the game.

In all other cases, the optimal strategy depends on how much each party knows about the drivers of the viewpoint of the other party, and the estimated marginal costs and benefits of continuing the game in an uncertain environment.

It is critical in attempting to resolve such differences of viewpoint to determine whence they arise, therefore, in order to determine the next step. If they are irresolvable in principle, it is important to establish that at the outset. If they are resolvable in principle, setting this framework out at the beginning will help identify the cause of the differences, and thus help to resolve them.

What applies to two parties is generalizable to any number, though the game-theoretic framework in any particular state of the game may be more complex. In all cases, transparency in establishing whether each party’s viewpoint is axiomatically held, reason-based or evidence-based, is the welfare-superior environment, and should be aimed for by an independent facilitator at the start of the game.

Addressing differences in this way helps also to distinguish whether views are being proposed out of conviction, or whether they are being advanced out of self-interest or as part of a strategy designed to achieve some other objective or interest.