Sunday, 19 June 2011

Moneyball Comes To Football


From the Financial Times this weekend comes an interesting piece by Simon Kuper on the increase in the use of statistics in football. A Football Revolution.

I recently visited Manchester City’s tranquil training ground in the village of Carrington. It was a glorious sunny morning, and outside the gates hired hands were washing footballers’ SUVs and sports cars. The defender Kolo Touré coasted past in a giant black contraption straight out of The Godfather. Carrington is used to cars like that: Manchester United train in the village too.

“Abu Dhabi Travellers Welcome”, said the message on the façade of City’s sky-blue training centre. Abu Dhabi’s ruling family owns Manchester City, and one thing it has done since buying the club is hire a large team of data analysts. Inside the building I found Gavin Fleig, City’s head of performance analysis, a polite sandy-haired man in a neat black City sweater. Hardly anyone outside Carrington has heard of him, and yet Fleig is a prime mover in English football’s data revolution. Largely unseen by public and media, data on players have begun driving clubs’ decisions – particularly decisions about which players to buy and sell. At many clubs, obscure statisticians in back-rooms will help shape this summer’s transfer market.

Fleig gave me the sort of professional presentation you’d expect from a “quant” in an investment bank. Lately, to his excitement, City had acquired stats on every player in the Premier League. Imagine, said Fleig, that you were thinking of signing an attacking midfielder. You wanted someone with a pass completion rate of 80 per cent, who had played a good number of games. Fleig typed the two criteria into his laptop. Portraits of the handful of men in the Premier League who met them flashed up on a screen. A couple were obvious: Arsenal’s Cesc Fàbregas and Liverpool’s Steven Gerrard. You didn’t need data to know they were good. But beside them was a more surprising face: Newcastle’s Kevin Nolan. The numbers wouldn’t immediately spur you to sign him. But they might prompt you to take a closer look.

In recent years, after many false starts, the number-crunchers at big English clubs have begun to unearth the player stats that truly matter. For instance, said Fleig, “The top four teams consistently have a higher percentage of pass completion in the final third of the pitch. Since the recruitment of Carlos Tévez, David Silva, Adam Johnson and Yaya Touré to our football team, in the last six months alone, our ability to keep the ball in the final third has grown by 7.7 per cent.”

That stat had not necessarily driven their recruitment, Fleig cautioned. Indeed, there are probably clubs that lean far more on stats than Manchester City do. I recently toured several actors in football’s data revolution, and was struck by how far it had progressed. “We’ve somewhere around 32 million data points over 12,000, 13,000 games now,” Mike Forde, Chelsea’s performance director, told me one morning in February in the empty stands of Stamford Bridge. Football is becoming clever.

Probably ever since the personal computer arrived, a few pioneers in football have tried to use data to judge players. Among the first was Arsenal’s future manager, Arsène Wenger, an economics graduate and keen mathematician. In the late 1980s, as manager of Monaco, Wenger used a computer program called Top Score, developed by a friend. A less likely pioneer was the late, great vodka-sodden Ukrainian manager Valeri Lobanovski. When I visited Kiev in 1992, Lobanovski’s pet scientist, Professor Anatoly Zelentsov, had me play the computer games that Dynamo Kiev had developed to test players. When Lobanovski said things like, “A team that commits errors in no more than 15 to 18 per cent of its actions is unbeatable,” he wasn’t guessing. Zelentsov’s team had run the numbers.

But the broader breakthrough came in 1996, after the Opta Index company began collecting “match data” from the English Premier League, explains the German author Christoph Biermann in Die Fussball-Matrix, the pioneering book on football and data. For the first time, clubs knew how many kilometres each player ran per match, and how many tackles and passes he made. Other data companies entered the market. Some football managers began to look at the stats. In August 2001 Manchester United’s manager Alex Ferguson suddenly sold his defender Jaap Stam to Lazio Roma. The move surprised everyone. Some thought Ferguson was punishing the Dutchman for a silly autobiography he had just published. In truth, although Ferguson didn’t say this publicly, the sale was prompted partly by match data. Studying the numbers, Ferguson had spotted that Stam was tackling less often than before. He presumed the defender, then 29, was declining. So he sold him.

As Ferguson later admitted, this was a mistake. Like many football men in the early days of match data, the manager had studied the wrong numbers. Stam wasn’t in decline at all: he would go on to have several excellent years in Italy. Still, the sale was a milestone in football history: a transfer driven largely by stats.

At Arsenal, Wenger embraced the new match data. He has said that the morning after a game he’s like a junkie who needs his fix: he reaches for the spreadsheets. In about 2002 he began substituting his forward Dennis Bergkamp late in matches. Bergkamp would go to Wenger to complain. “Then he’d produce the stats,” Bergkamp later recalled. “‘Look Dennis, after 70 minutes you began running less. And your speed declined.’ Wenger is a football professor.”

Few would suspect it of West Ham’s new manager “Big Sam” Allardyce, and yet his somewhat neolithic appearance also conceals a professorial mind. As a player, Allardyce spent a year with Tampa Bay, Florida, where he grew fascinated with the way American sports used science and data. In 1999 he became manager of little Bolton. Unable to afford the best players, he hired good statisticians instead. They unearthed one particular stat that enchanted Allardyce. “The average game, the ball changes hands 400 times,” recites Chelsea’s Forde, who got his start in football under Allardyce. “Big Sam” would drum it into his players. To him, it summed up the importance of switching instantly to defensive positions the moment the ball was lost.

More concretely, stats led Allardyce to a source of cheap goals: corners, throw-ins and free kicks. Fleig, another Allardyce alumnus, recalled that Bolton would score 45 to 50 per cent of their goals from such “set-pieces”, compared with a league average of about a third. Fleig said, “We would be looking at, ‘If a defender cleared the ball from a long throw, where would the ball land? Well, this is the area it most commonly lands. Right, well that’s where we’ll put our man.’”

In 2003, football’s data revolution got a new impetus from across the Atlantic. Michael Lewis published his seminal baseball book Moneyball, and some people in English football read it and sat up. Moneyball recounts how the Oakland A’s general manager Billy Beane used new stats to value baseball players. Aided by data, the little A’s briefly punched far above their weight until bigger clubs began hiring statisticians too. The Boston Red Sox, owned by John Henry, himself a “numbers guy” who had made his fortune trading commodities, won two world series using “Moneyball” methods.

This February I visited Beane at the Oakland Coliseum. We spoke in what looked like the junk room, but is in fact the dingy clubhouse where the A’s players change. Beane – soon to be portrayed by Brad Pitt in the movie Moneyball – was keen to talk about the data revolution in soccer. Like many Americans this last decade, Beane has embraced the European game with the almost unhealthy fervour of the convert. He can often be found sprawled on a dilapidated sofa in the clubhouse watching European soccer matches.

He believes that just as baseball has turned into “more of a science”, soccer will too. Beane said, “If somebody’s right 30 per cent of the time using gut feel, and you can find a way to be right 35 per cent, you create a 5 per cent arbitrage, and in sports that can make the difference between winning and losing.” If using numbers gives you an edge, then everyone will end up having to do it, Beane thinks.

Mike Forde, who had studied in Beane’s hometown of San Diego and followed American sports, made the pilgrimage to Oakland to quiz Beane about the uses of data. That proved tricky: Beane spent the first few hours of the conversation quizzing Forde about soccer. “In the last half an hour I managed to turn it around to talk about his role in baseball,” laughs Forde. He became friends with Beane, as did the Frenchman Damien Comolli, a former assistant of Wenger’s. In 2005, Comolli became director of football at Tottenham and began using data there.

Comolli’s three years at Spurs encapsulated many of the early struggles of the data revolution. British football had always been suspicious of educated people. The typical football manager was an ex-player who had left school at 16 and ruled his club like an autocrat. He relied on “gut”, not numbers. He wasn’t about to obey a spreadsheet-wielding Frenchman who had never played professionally himself. Comolli was always having to fight “nerds versus jocks” battles. With hindsight, he unearthed some excellent players for Spurs: Luka Modric, Dimitar Berbatov, Heurelho Gomes and the 17-year-old Gareth Bale. Yet eventually Comolli was forced out.

There was one question the nerds kept having to answer. Yes, the traditionalists would say, stats may well be useful in a stop-start game like baseball. The pitcher pitches, the batter hits, and that event provides oodles of clear data for nerds to crunch. But surely football is too fluid a game to measure?

Forde responds: “Well, I think it’s a really genuine question. It’s one that we ask ourselves all the time.” However, the nerds can answer it. For a start, good mathematicians can handle complex systems. At Chelsea, for instance, one of Forde’s statisticians has a past in insurance modelling. Football – a game of 22 men played on a limited field with set rules – is not of unparalleled complexity.

Second, in recent years the fluid game of basketball has found excellent uses for data. Beane says: “If it can be done there, it can be done on the soccer field.” And third, a third of all goals in football don’t come from fluid situations at all. They come from corners, free kicks, penalties and throw-ins – stop-start set-pieces that you can analyse much like a pitch in baseball.

The new nerds could point to so many obvious irrationalities in football, especially in the transfer market, so many areas where smart clubs could clean up. For instance: goalkeepers have longer careers than forwards, yet earn less and command much lower transfer fees. Clubs often sign large players but actually tend to use the smaller ones, having belatedly realised that they have overvalued size. And few clubs have asked themselves even basic questions such as: do they earn more points when certain players are on the field?

Given that you can hire perhaps 30 statisticians for the £1.5m that the average footballer in the Premier League earns each year, you’d think it might be worth paying some nerds to study these questions. Nonetheless, to some degree football’s suspicion of numbers persists. “Letting even a top-level statistician loose with a more traditional football manager is not really the right combination,” Forde once told me. He himself looks like a football man: trim, greying, regional accent, nice suit. That helps him sell numbers to old-style football men. But, in many clubs, the nerds are only slowly gaining power. Probably every club in the Premier League now employs analysts, but some of these people get locked in computer-filled back-rooms and never meet the manager.

That’s why the data revolution was led by clubs where the manager himself trusted numbers. Arsenal and Allardyce’s Bolton began to value players in much the way that financial investors value cattle futures. Take Bolton’s purchase of the 34-year-old central midfielder Gary Speed in 2004. On paper, Speed looked too old. But Bolton, said Fleig, “was able to look at his physical data, to compare it against young players in his position at the time who were at the top of the game, the Steven Gerrards, the Frank Lampards. For a 34-year-old to be consistently having the same levels of physical output as those players, and showing no decline over the previous two seasons, was a contributing factor to say: ‘You know what, this isn’t going to be a huge concern.’” Speed played for Bolton until he was 38.

Football’s shrewdest number-crunchers have always understood that data can only support a decision about a player. They cannot determine it. Biermann tells the story of how Wenger in 2004 was looking for an heir to Arsenal’s all-action midfielder Patrick Vieira. Wenger wanted a player who could cover lots of ground. He scanned the data from different European leagues and spotted an unknown teenager at Olympique Marseille named Mathieu Flamini, who was running 14km a game. Alone, that stat wasn’t enough. Did Flamini run in the right direction? Could he play football? Wenger went to look, established that he could, and signed him for peanuts. Flamini prospered at Arsenal before joining Milan to earn even more.

Conversely, the clubs that stuck with “gut” rather than numbers began to suffer. In 2003, Real Madrid sold Claude Makélélé to Chelsea for £17m. It seemed a big fee for an unobtrusive 30-year-old defensive midfielder. “We will not miss Makélélé,” said Madrid’s president Florentino Pérez. “His technique is average, he lacks the speed and skill to take the ball past opponents, and 90 per cent of his distribution either goes backwards or sideways. He wasn’t a header of the ball and he rarely passed the ball more than three metres. Younger players will cause Makélélé to be forgotten.”
Pérez’s critique wasn’t totally wrong, and yet Madrid had made a terrible error. Makélélé would have five excellent years at Chelsea. There’s now even a position in football named after him: the “Makélélé role”. If only Real had studied the numbers, they might have spotted what made him unique. Forde explained: “Most players are very active when they’re aimed towards the opposition’s goal, in terms of high-intensity activity. Few players are strong going the other way. If you look at Claude, 84 per cent of the time he did high-intensity work, it was when the opposition had the ball, which was twice as much as anyone else on the team.”

If you watched the game, you could miss Makélélé. If you looked at the data, there he was. Similarly, if you looked at Manchester City’s Yaya Touré, with his languid running style, you might think he was slow. If you looked at the numbers, you’d see that he wasn’t. Beane says, “What stats allow you to do is not take things at face value. The idea that I trust my eyes more than the stats, I don’t buy that because I’ve seen magicians pull rabbits out of hats and I just know that rabbit’s not in there.”

Yet by the mid-2000s, the numbers men in football were becoming uneasily aware that many of the stats they had been trusting for years were useless. In any industry, people use the data they have. The data companies had initially calculated passes, tackles and kilometres per player, and so the clubs had used these numbers to judge players. However, it was becoming clear that these raw stats – which now get beamed up on TV during big games – mean little. Forde remembers the early hunt for meaning in the data on kilometres. “Can we find a correlation between total distance covered and winning? And the answer was invariably no.”

Tackles seemed a poor indicator too. There was the awkward issue of the great Italian defender Paolo Maldini. “He made one tackle every two games,” Forde noted ruefully. Maldini positioned himself so well that he didn’t need to tackle. That rather argued against judging defenders on their number of tackles, the way Ferguson had when he sold Stam. Forde said, “I sat in many meetings at Bolton, and I look back now and think ‘Wow, we hammered the team over something that now we think is not relevant.’” Looking back at the early years of data, Fleig concludes: “We should be looking at something far more important.”

That is starting to happen now. Football’s “quants” are isolating the numbers that matter. “A lot of that is proprietary,” Forde told me. “The club has been very supportive of this particular space, so we want to keep some of it back.” But the quants will discuss certain findings that are becoming common knowledge in soccer. For instance, rather than looking at kilometres covered, clubs now prefer to look at distances run at top speed. “There is a correlation between the number of sprints and winning,” Daniele Tognaccini, AC Milan’s chief athletics coach, told me in 2008.

That’s why Fleig cares about “a player’s high-intensity output”. Different data companies measured this quality differently, he said, “but ultimately it’s a player’s ability to reach a speed threshold of seven metres per second.” If you valued this quality, you would probably have never made the mistake Juventus did in 1999 of selling Thierry Henry to Arsenal. “For Henry to reach seven metres per second, it’s a relative coast,” said Fleig admiringly. The Frenchman got there almost whenever he ran.

Equally crucial is the ability to make repeated sprints. Tévez, Manchester City’s little forward, is a bit like a wind-up doll: he’ll sprint, briefly collapse, then very soon afterwards be sprinting again. Fleig said, “If we want to press from the front, then we can look at Carlos’s physical output and know that he’s capable of doing that for 90 minutes-plus.”

Just as clubs have learned to isolate sprints from other running, they have learned to isolate telling passes from meaningless square balls. On the screen in Carrington, Fleig flashed up a list of City’s players, ranked by how many chances each had created. One name stood out: David Silva had passed for a third more goal-scoring opportunities than any of his teammates.

The new wash of data has made it easy to compare players to players, and clubs to clubs. Wigan, for instance, were recently conceding a greater proportion of their goals from crosses than any other team in the Premier League. If you’re playing Wigan, that’s handy to know. Increasingly, clubs are acting on the data. A quant has controlled Arsenal for 15 years now, but last autumn the numbers guys took over another English giant. The Boston Red Sox’s owner John Henry, who in 2002 had tried to hire Billy Beane, bought Liverpool and immediately hired Beane’s mate Comolli to do a “Moneyball of soccer”.

From his perch at Anfield, Comolli often chats to the father of Moneyball 5,000 miles away. Beane says: “You can call him anytime. I’ll e-mail him and it will be two in the morning there and he’ll be up, and he’ll e-mail me and say, ‘Hey, I’m watching the A’s game’, because he watches on the computer. The guy never sleeps.” At Liverpool, Comolli has genuine power. He has said that data informed the club’s recent purchases of Andy Carroll and Luis Suarez for a combined £60m.
And football’s data revolution has only just got going. Fleig thinks there is an exciting future in sociograms: who passes to whom, who tends to start a team’s dangerous attacks? If you play Barcelona, that man is obviously Xavi. But in another team, the data may show that the launcher of attacks is someone unexpected. If you know the zones where he puts his key passes, you can try blocking them.

Someone who has thought harder than most about the future of soccer stats is the director of baseball operations at the Oakland A’s. Farhan Zaidi is a round MIT economics graduate with a sense of humour. He’s the sort of guy you’d expect to meet late one night in a bar in a college town, after a gig, not at a professional sports club. For work, Zaidi crunches baseball stats. But he and Beane spend much of their time at the Coliseum arguing about their other loves: the British band Oasis, and soccer. In 2006, in the middle of the baseball season, they travelled to the soccer world cup in Germany together. Zaidi chuckled: “We spend so much time together, that if all we ever talked about was the numbers on these spreadsheets, we would have killed each other a long time ago.”

Because Zaidi knows where the data revolution in baseball has gone, he can make predictions for soccer. The sport’s holy grail, he thinks, is a stat he calls “Goal Probability Added”. That stat would capture how much each player’s actions over his career increased the chance of his team scoring (for instance, whenever he successfully passed the ball five yards forward from the halfway line), or decreased it (for example, whenever his pass was unsuccessful). I asked Zaidi whether one day pundits might say things like, “Luis Suarez has a Goal Probability Added of 0.60, but Carroll’s GPA is only 0.56.”

Zaidi replied, “I tend to think that will happen, because that’s what happened in baseball. We talk now about players in ways that we wouldn’t have dreamed of 10 or 15 years ago.”

In their ancient battle against the jocks, the nerds are finally taking revenge.
Simon Kuper is author of ‘The Football Men: Up Close with the Giants of the Modern Game’ (Simon & Schuster, £16.99)

Saturday, 18 June 2011

El Tricolor


I am beginning to think that backing the Over 3.5 goals in elimination games when the score is 2-1 is a winning strategy. It worked rather well in the UEFA Champions League final, and it worked again today in the U-17 World Cup game between Mexico and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, aka North Korea.

Obviously, in elimination games, teams trailing by 1-2 have no option but to chase the game and leave themselves exposed to a breakaway goal. While I have no reason to believe that the market is incorrectly pricing these games, for an interest and a Premium Charge reduction strategy, I can think of worse ideas. It is always possible that the relatively small number of matches that meet this criteria means that the market is not priced efficiently, but something to watch anyway.

The elimination phase of the CONCACAF Gold Cup 2011 tournament begins today with Costa Rica v Honduras and Mexico v Guatamala. In a lean summer for football, this is as good as it gets, and I'll be watching for 2-1 score-lines!

Dry Summer


Summer's are supposed to be dry. OK, so technically, Summer isn't here for a few more days, but the dry spell from my betting perspective is here. Cricket continues to be a challenge - as I've written before, it appears that others understand this sport far better than I do, and for the most part I leave it alone. I got involved in an India v West Indies ODI a couple of days ago, and read it all wrong, in the end walking away with no loss, but no win either. A waste of time in other words.

I don't even enjoy watching cricket, which would probably help! I didn't much care for playing it when I look back. Batting or bowling was fun, but my preferred fielding position was wicket-keeper simply because it meant I had an interest in every delivery, and when my team was batting, I secretly wanted my team to lose wickets so that I could get out there and swing away.

I wasn't much of a team player in my youth. One new football season, my under-strength Croydon West End team lost the opening game 2-9, but the two goals were both scored by me. At the end of the game, when the manager tried to cheer us up, I needed no cheering up. It's fair to say that my comment, partly joking, but with a grain of truth, along the lines that I would rather lose 2-9 and score both goals than win 1-0 and not be the scorer, didn't go down too well.

It's fortunate that betting is a solitary activity.

Baseball liquidity remains poor, and while I remain up overall on the season, this last week has been poor. I'm continuing to track the MLB Free Daily Picks but they appear to be going the same way as the free Under Over Soccer Picks, with both showing an ROI of around -7.5%. Updated results at Gold All Over.

Thursday, 16 June 2011

Stanley Cup Runneth Over


As I suggested in the recent Mouths To Feed post, the pre-game value in game 7 of the Stanley Cup 'lay' in opposing the Vancouver Canucks at home at 1.71.

While they had won all three home games, they had not impressed in doing so, winning each by just the one goal, and as luck tends to do, it ran out last night as they lost 0-4 to the Boston Bruins.

Boston could still be backed at 1.89 when a goal ahead, and when the dust had settled, it was my biggest ice-hockey win of the season. Not that that announcement is as good as it sounds, since my forays into the sport are few and far between these days.

At the half-way point of June, usually a quiet month, this is already the second best June ever, although 2009 is unlikely to be beaten.

It's usually at this time of the year, when the NBA and NHL seasons conclude, that liquidity starts to pick up in the baseball. Time will tell.

The 'void-if-tied' rule on the 5 Innings Moneyline market means that in a game tied at the middle of the fifth innings, you can get a free bet on the home team. Unfortunately the only money available is usually £2.43 at 1.01 which is not going to make you rich any time soon, but it IS free money. I'm exploiting a loophole, something that many of you may have read about day trader Barnett Alexander, who has been fined £1 million for exploiting a loophole, or price-rigging the markets depending on your point of view, and making profits from spread-betting companies after betting on subsequent price movements. 

Sounds rather similar to 'spoofing' which reportedly goes on in horse-racing markets on a frequent basis. While Alexander claims to have done nothing wrong, when you use the accounts of others for your trades, that doesn't look good. Still, it was quite a clever idea I thought, unlike this motley crew from Shropshire, some of who, it is alleged, funded their gambling from 'pimping out' an under-age girl. Classy.

Wednesday, 15 June 2011

Comfort Level


Average Guy asks:

Hello again, constant reference to appropriate stake size both here and on other blogs. Do you have a hard rule whereby it's a simple % of bank or is it related to %bank and the odds ? Is there a comfort level of exposure that should not be exceeded (obviously varies from trader to trader) or do you allow your stake / exposure to be affected by your own perception of the likelihood of the outcome ?
Appropriate stake size may not be as important as value, but it is very important.

In simple terms, the bigger your edge, the greater the percentage of your bank that you should be staking. 2.5% is probably a reasonable maximum to stake, although I can't honestly say that I adhere to that percentage myself. With a decent sized bank, achieved for the most part through in-play trading, 2.5% is an amount that I consider too high for a pure punt.

In-play trading is another matter altogether. For one thing, as has been discussed recently, the 'stake' is the maximum amount that I am prepared to lose, and while it does happen that I lose the lot on occasion, it's rare. Losses are usually far less than the maximum amount put out there.

The second thing is that in-play value can be huge. Not in sports like football (proper) perhaps, but look at a sport like the American version as an example - a sport where an interception returned for a seemingly game-winning touchdown can be overruled seconds later. Turned over 1.01s are not that rare and if you can lay at a price with a high degree of confidence that the price will soon be significantly higher, and if the worse comes to the worse you can exit with a small loss, then it would be pretty silly, in my opinion, to limit yourself to 2.5% of your bank. I've written before how one of the safest methods there is, is to lay the team scoring the opening touchdown in a game. The price always goes too low, and each £1,000 layed will make you £10 a point when the market corrects, and you can lay several thousand for little risk at these times.

To answer the second part of the comment, yes there definitely is a comfort level and my subconscious often recognises this before my conscious. I know I have exceeded the comfort level when I feel uncomfortable! Simply put, £5,000 at risk might be comfortable or uncomfortable. It's not the amount - it's the situation, and my perception of value.

Tuesday, 14 June 2011

Mouths To Feed


A very pleasing end to the NBA Finals, with the Dallas Mavericks showing that you don't need three superstars to win the Championship, but that playing as a team works rather well. Dallas is an awful city, full of Texans, but it's hard not too be pleased for owner Mark Cuban, star Dirk Nowitzki and veteran Jason Kidd as they won the franchise's first ever title. "Cavs for Mavs" shirts sold well in Cleveland apparently.

It's unfortunate that the NBA season has to end, and even more so with the prospect of a prolonged close season as the Collective Bargaining Agreement between players and the NBA expires. It happened in 1998 too, when the season was reduced to 50 games and as Newsburglar.com puts it:

The league broke the union last time and there is no reason to believe that they can’t do it again.

Many NBA players seem to have no difficulty blowing through the millions they collect. Give sixty percent of your earnings to the government and your agent and $10 million a year quickly becomes $4 million. That $34 million contract is really only worth $14 million.

That’s a lot of money. But when you’ve got four houses, fifteen cars, eight illegitimate children, a twenty person entourage and a few bad investments, it's no wonder some NBA players live paycheck to paycheck.
Indeed, it must be a hard life. As former star Latrell Sprewell once said while turning down down a three-year, $21 million contract extension, "I've got my family to feed". Largely remembered for choking and threatening to kill his coach in 1997 and receiving a 68 game suspension, Sprewell's comment didn't draw too much sympathy from the public, though most of them, I'm sure, were saddened to hear that since retiring, his yacht was repossessed, two of his homes foreclosed upon, and he has been prohibited from seeing his children. Classy.

Sprewell's not the only one with mouths to feed. While my kids are pretty much feeding themselves these days, I do have two dogs to feed, and the loss, or partial loss of an NBA season would not be good news, and it's a situation exacerbated by the possible disruption to the 2011 NFL season.

The NBA season just ended was my best to date, helped by a more cautious approach during the play-offs. After three losing Aprils in the last four years, strategies that worked in the regular season didn't seem to work quite so well in play-off games, but why not? I think the answer was that the fact it was a play-off game subconsciously made me think that I should be able to win more, and I over-staked, often going in too big too early. As we all know after reading this blog, over-staking leads to poor decision making. This year I made a conscious effort to have a profitable April, likely losing some profits in the process, but the psychological boost to my confidence, while worthless in cash terms, was of more importance for once.

I have updated the final results for the NBA Daily Picks site over at Gold All Over. At one time, one of my best (most lucrative) sports was NHL, but the lengthy countdown introduced by Betfair in 2007 pretty much killed liquidity. It was said at the time that the change was to protect clients from Canadian viewers who had 'faster' pictures, but as with games involving the Toronto Raptors in the NBA, or Toronto Blue Jays in baseball, I simply avoided these matches. Yes, there are plenty of Canadian NHL teams, but a Colorado Avalanche - Dallas Stars game isn't likely to have high viewing figures in Canada.

And finally, consider this. In 1976, Montreal hosted the Olympics. The following year, the Montreal Canadiens won the Stanley Cup. In 1998, Calgary hosted the Olymics. The following year, the Calgary Flames won the Stanley Cup.

The 2010 Olympics were held in Vancouver. The 2011 Stanley Cup winners? It's either the Vancouver Canucks or Boston Bruins. It's come down to a game seven on Wednesday night - in Vancouver. So far, the home team was won every game, although Vancouver's three wins have all been by a single goal, including one in overtime. Not too convincing.

A lay may well be the play here, depending of course, on Vancouver's price. Strangely, four of the first five games were won by the team with the fewest shots - including game 3 where Vancouver had 41 shots to 38, yet lost 1-8.

Sunday, 12 June 2011

Trading Your Fastest 5k Ever


Towards the end of the first mile on my run this morning, the thought of how similar running is to trading - specifically that you can read all the books in the world about how to do it, but nothing helps you until you start doing it yourself.

It's all very well reading about rest days, long runs, intervals, fartleks (snigger) etc., but the only way to "Run Your Fastest 5k Ever" is to get out there and start running. Reading the theory is useful to an extent, but it in no way prepares the body. Similarly with trading, you can read all the books in the world about trading, and paper trade for months, but it's only when you start to do it for real that you really start to learn.

When you're reading about running at a certain pace, you have no idea how you will feel physically, and similarly you can read about taking a position size of 2% of your bank, but you have no idea how you will handle this unless it's for real. What might be an insignificant amount when you are paper trading can seem a lot more significant when your money is on the line.

Practice makes perfect. Well, maybe not perfect, but running frequently will increase your pace over time, although for those of us over a certain age it's a battle against the decline in athletic performance that comes with old age. Same with trading I guess - there was an excellent post on the subject of how our peak age for financial decisions is 53 - before that we are gaining experience, after that age, we are heading downward to senility! With running, the age is more like 28 I would guess. Which is at least better than women's gymnastics, where you peak at 12!

Saturday, 11 June 2011

Anatomy Of A Trade IMO


Average Guy had a comment that is worth discussing further:

Hello, respect your thoughts but referring the basketball trade that nearly went very wrong. Are you really trading if you only get out when it suits you with a profit but do not accept a substantial loss ? Not questioning your logic as you are obviously successful but what's the difference between a blind punt and what you did ? I need to rationalize this as I do it constantly and feel like crap as I watch the losses double or treble because of an inability to cut and run ?
Ignoring that in my experience, when someone says "With all due respect" or "I respect your thoughts" what they really mean is "I think you're an idiot", it's a good question.

First of all, I was in and out of that market several times before that lay at 1.69, all trades that were exited when the value was to do so (in my opinion). I have no doubt that I am a trader rather than a punter although on occasion I will let my trades run, or add to a position, if it is value (in my opinion) to do so. Looking at the details in My Account, prior to laying Dallas at 1.69, I had layed them at 1.74, 1.72, 1.67 and 1.96, with lays of Miami at prices ranging from 1.68 to 2.38.

Secondly, I do not "only get out when it suits [me] with a profit". At one point in the first-half I was green on both sides to the tune of around £400, (thinking "this is easy") but by half-time, I was down to around just £50 on each side. I took the losses because the value was gone, and it was the right decision to 'cut and run'.

Thirdly, and specifically with the lay of Dallas at 1.69, this was a position entered in the second half of a game, and I believe it is true that Dallas never led by more than 7 until late on in the game after Miami had closed the gap, gone odds-on and I had closed out my position. In my opinion, it was never value to close out, and in fact I added to my position by laying an additional £1,886 at 1.46 16 minutes later, and 13 minutes after that, a little more at 1.32. It was my opinion that, as is often the case in a close basketball game, the prices available were value lays, not backs.

I've used the term "in my opinion" several times in this post, and for a reason. Betting odds are not exact probabilities in the same way that the outcome of throwing a die or tossing a coin are. They are the result of opinions. If your opinion is right more than it is wrong, then you will come out ahead in the long run. My opinion will not always be correct, at least not when it comes to betting, but it would be wrong for me to have 'cut and run' for a big loss if it wasn't value to do so - in my opinion. It's a spin on the "should I green up at 1.01 or let the bet run" issue. Assuming you are not over-staked, then you lay at 1.01 if it is value to do so, not just because you can.

I don't like big losses, but the occasional big hit is unavoidable. Fortunately the more frequent wins mean that the trend is upwards, and it's only when the trend becomes downward that you need to re-consider your strategy. Some might argue that you should always have a stop-loss in mind when entering a position. I don't agree, at least not for sports where the prices can move fast. What price should my stop-loss be? A stop-loss for the sake of it doesn't make sense. The game-state is constantly changing, as are the prices. Backing back at say, 1.5 might be value if Dallas are up by 20 (excellent value in fact, and used for illustrative purposes only), but would be terrible value if they were down by 20 (bear with me, I'm trying to make my point). What if Dallas are up by 10? Would 1.5 be value then? Well, it might be, but it might not. How much time remains? What is the foul situation? Any key injuries?

The fact is, I never felt that backing Dallas at the prices available, given the state of the game, was value. Experience gives you the confidence to put your money where your mouth is, and means that even if you lose, you're OK with it because you made the right decisions.

A good comment though, and while it's not good to take a big loss, it's far worse to take a big loss when it is not value to do so, and then watch as your initial opinion is proved correct and the price comes roaring back. If you stake sensibly, you should be able to make the correct decision. It's when you are over-staked that panic sets in and you close out a position in desperation. Fear and greed drive the markets remember. To quote Warren Buffett "Be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful".

Friday, 10 June 2011

Accounting For My Taste


Young Curly is back for another blogging effort over at Part-Time Gambling, and while his first few posts are a good read, (not quite as good a read as this blog of course), only time will tell if he can stay the course or fall by the wayside, a fate that seems to befall so many blogs about betting. I think a lot of enthusiastic wannabe professional gamblers stumble across the exchanges, think all they need to do is open an account and make a steady income, and want to brog / blag about their success. When it doesn't turn out to be quite that easy, the enthusiasm for both bloging and betting quickly dies. It's hard to be enthusiastic about losing money!

I've made a change to my accounting procedures, whereby I now deduct the Premium Charge from the previous week's most profitable day. That saves me from starting a new month with a hit on the PC which really belongs to the previous month, and it stops me from highlighting record highs only to have the spreadsheet take what appears to be a drop a few days later. I maintain moving averages too, and it messes these up if it is entered after the fact. Perhaps a little pointless, but it's one of the annoyances of the Premium Charge that it can be almost a week and a half after a win before you know how much you really won and I feel better applying it retro-actively to the best day. If I were really anal about it, I would pro-rate it across the charged week's profitable days, but even I am not that sad. Well, maybe I am, but I just don't have the time for it.

The 100% record of teams winning the third game in a tied 2-3-2 series in the NBA Finals is on the line after the Dallas Mavericks won another thriller against the Miami Heat to take a 3-2 lead to Miami, just one win away from the title. I layed Dallas at what I thought was a value 1.69 early in the third quarter, but it all went pear shaped as the price dropped to the low 1.3s. I considered bailing out for a £1.5k loss, but finally Miami rallied, went odds-on, and with my nerves shot, I saw value in greening up at that price, and came away with a modest win as Dallas pulled away.

To end with Curly again, he had some words on the ROI and trading subject:

If only you could have won and then lost a little more.

Whilst I agree that ROI is in some ways irrelevant that is mainly because the 'investment' part is hard to put a value to. If you back £100 at 2.0, lay £100 at 1.9 and repeat 3 times and your selection goes onto win your profit minus commission is £30. So your ROI could be determined as 30% or 10%. The problem with saying its only 10% is you never actually risked £300.

However to completely ignore the £300 is perhaps just as wrong. An example for this, scenario A you back £100 at 2.0 lay £100 at 1.9 back £100 at 1.6 and lay again at 1.5 for a profit of £20. Scenario B you have 20 backs of £100 at an avg of 1.9 and 20 £100 lays at 1.89 for a profit of £20. If you calculate ROI as a % of risk then they are both 20% if you look at total investment you come up with 10% and 1%. I believe a long time ago you discussed something similar to this and possibly broached the topic of ROCE as a measure (I may be wrong).
He is actually wrong, ROCE (Return On Capital Employed) has never been the subject of a post by me. It probably won't be any time soon either. It seems to be the consensus that ROI / ROCE or whatever, are all rather meaningless for in-play trading, and nigh on impossible to work out after a busy trading game. I'd need a qualified accountant, and my son still has another year to go!

So this accountant dies, and he reaches the pearly gates and is amazed to see a happy crowd all waving banners and chanting his name.

After a few minutes, St. Peter comes running across and says, "I'm sorry I wasn't here to greet you personally. God is looking forward to meeting such a remarkable man as yourself."

The accountant is perplexed. "I've tried to lead a good life, but I am overwhelmed by your welcome," he tells St. Peter.

"It's the least we can do for someone as special as you are. Imagine, living to the age of 123 and still looking so young," says St. Peter.

The man looks even more dumbfounded and replies, "123 years old? I don't know what you mean. I'm only 40."

St. Peter replies, "But that can't be right - we've seen your time sheets!"

Thursday, 9 June 2011

So Close


The screenshot shows how close I came to dodging the PC bullet this week. If only I could have lost a little more!

A couple more comments to comment on, the first being Scott Ferguson's take on the question of traders 'never actually committing to stating what return on investment they are targeting or achieving.'

Part of the reason for that is that ROI doesn't really work for trading. From a bank of £200, I might turn it over 2x or 10x or 100x, depending on what event it is. Turnover (investment) is irrelevant - there's the absolute limit of what you are prepared to risk, although for most that is only a figure they temporarily use in the market to work back from, or I'd look at it more from the angle of 'what value is my time worth'. And there's also the angle of not setting a limit on what you want to win because every opportunity is different
As Scott says, your risk is your limit, but the reward can be anything upwards of that amount. Lay at 1.01 and you either let the bet expire, (for a loss or for 100 times your stake), or you green up at some point in-between. It's impossible to say what ROI you are targeting.

Scott (not Ferguson this time) is having trouble commenting. Not sure if this is a widespread problem or not, but I haven't heard any complaints before. Re: my Kelly post, Scott said:
Sounds fascinating.

A further explanation of precisely who the prolific ROI-boosting Kelly is would make it even more interesting.

Is Kelly a male or a female?

How does he/she split himself into two?

On a separate note, I share your pain with the MLB daily picks of late.

Are you just laying the home favourites with the minus ratings or are you staking all the posted ratings that are showing value?

I continue to read your blog with great interest.
Lest Scott, or anyone, be unaware of the great John L Kelly, start here, with a post about a post on Scott (Ferguson's) blog. A lot of Scotts around today.

Regarding the MLB Daily Picks, I am blindly following the one pick of the day selection. After a promising start, a losing run of six took away any system profits, but my profits will come from a reduced PC rather than from this system itself. The losing run was halted at six last night, as the Tampa Bay Rays won 4-3 at the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim in extra innings. Losing runs are to be expected though, when the average price is 2.15.

I'm also following the Free Under Over Soccer picks for the same reason. 1.94 is the average price for these, and they have a longest losing sequence of 5.

Wednesday, 8 June 2011

Wayward Target Shooting


Wayward Lad commented on my last post that:

I always find it interesting when reading the posts of Traders that they never actually commit to stating what return on investment they are targeting or achieving. This isn't a criticism.
One trader I'm aware of has a max exposure of £1,250 for a target return of £75 per "play"; which he repeats 10 or 12 times a day, 6 days a week. If you max exposure is £5000, what return on that are you hoping to achieve (you don't have to answer if you don't want too)? I like your blog btw, but I'm not a trader.

The answer is that as an in-play trader, I am targeting as high a return on the investment as possible. For instance, when I lay at say 1.0x, I will let that bet ride until the point that it becomes value to lay the bet off, which may mean taking a loss at a lower 1.0x or greening up at a higher price, or indeed letting the bet run to expiry. I certainly do not enter the trade with a set goal of making one tick or two ticks or whatever. If my exposure is the full £5,000, it is in my conservative nature to at least reduce that amount a little sooner than I might if my exposure is £50, and while I would always hope to do that only if it is value to do so, I do accept that in my haste to trim my exposure, and bring my breathing back to normal, I may sometimes be giving away value. But it's good for my health!

I will also trade out of positions pre-game in the rare event that a price moves enough to take it from a value back to a value lay for example. To take an extreme example just to illustrate the point, I might have a team priced at 2.0 and find I can back it at 2.2. If closer to kick-off, the price drifts to 1.8, then I will lock in some green, but again, when I made the initial bet, I do not target a set return on the investment.

As a racing man, you likely view trading differently to myself. I am not trading to scalp one or two ticks of profit - I enter a position because I think that a price is wrong, and will correct itself. If circumstances mean that the price continues to represent value, I ride the wave.

I am not a big fan of setting targets, whether they be daily, weekly or a set number of ticks. I believe that they constrain you, and you end up losing money, either by forcing you to make poor value bets to achieve your target, or by encouraging you to trade out of a position simply because the target has been reached.

Daily targets are the most ridiculous. In the sports I mainly follow, some days there just aren't any value opportunities at all. Other days, there might be several. To force myself to bet when I shouldn't, or not bet when I should, is just nonsensical.

You enter a trade when it is value to do so, and you exit a trade when it is value to do so - not because your target (or stop-loss) has been reached.

When Bets Go Wild


Brian commented:

Good post there. Some big losses though. How did you recover form them and what % of your bank did they account for? What is the max % you would bet nowadays compared to in the past? Keep up the good work.
Alcohol? Lost £1,317.82 on 31st August 2006. -27%
Distracted? Lost £3,148.76 on 25th July, 2006. -54%
Tired? Lost £5,183.31 on 1st January, 2007. -29%
Chasing? Lost £2,841.59 on 4th January, 2007. -22%

The longest it took me to recover was 227 days after that New Year's Day debacle in 2007, a loss that was compounded by a losing February and April before I righted the ship, and steered a steady course to profit once more.

It didn't help that I had just started dating Mrs. Cassini, and my usual routine was somewhat disrupted. It wasn't really her fault, but if I have a shortcoming, it is that things are never my fault - it's always because of something out of my control.

What did help was that I knew what my mistake had been, and that there was nothing wrong with my strategy, only that I needed to stick to it. That discipline thing again.

My maximum exposure has always been £5,000. I've never asked for that to be raised, and as my style is more in laying at low odds, rather than backing at them, the limit isn't usually a problem. When a bot went wild at the end of a college basketball game earlier this year I did miss out, but that's the only time.

In the early days, the percentage of my bank at risk was higher than it is today. Right now I have a fair sized bank, so it's not possible for me to lose the percentages from a few years ago, and usually 2.5% is about as high as I'll go, which seems to be reasonable enough. I will occasionally commit the full £5,000 on an in-play trade but I would cut my losses if the market moved against me, and never expect to lose the whole amount.

While I don't consciously have an amount that I am comfortable betting, my body soon lets me know if I've over committed - and my wife can hear my breathing pattern change to heavy, so she knows as well and stays away! A side benefit of this is that I am able to watch hours of "When Girls Go Wild" videos without fear of interruption, although they are nowhere near as exciting as "When Bots Go Wild". So I'm told.

It also depends on how good the value on the bet was. Losing £1,000 on a good value bet is a lot easier to take than losing the same amount after making a stupid error.

Tuesday, 7 June 2011

Reality Check

I recently removed the link to John O'Dwyer's blog, as none of you most likely noticed. It was getting rather repetitive, with the set format of each post along the lines of "still no money due to a small bank size", never mind that I have told John (pictured above)that bank size isn't the issue, betting without an edge is the issue.

He clearly isn't interested in advice, as several helpful comments were never published, proof that while, as the saying goes, “you can lead a whore to culture, you can't make her think”. Or something like that.

While I'm not holding my breath that he is serious about finishing, (that would suggest he had seen the truth, which I doubt), he did write a post yesterday, later redacted, that went:

Finished is a headline I hoped I wouldn't use. Nearly anyway. If I wrote the extent of how bad things really are on here it would shock a few people, and it has nothing to do with losing. I've not been losing recently, I've just not had the means to do anything about it for the time I need. There is big money to be made here as well. I've already won £350 mythical quid from predicting a new winner of the woman's French Open and Rafa as the winner of the men's, but what good is that?! When I did make the money I made 2 weeks back, I withdraw most and paid off various credit cards. I've been using an ultra small bank and seeing as this is my only form of income, it's an impossible task.

I've had a bad few months overall on Betfair and not been able to do what I did last year. I know a 1001% why. I'm using too small a bank size. My Betfair bank at the moment is £2.66 and it's not been higher than a tenner for about a week now, hence the small amount. I owe about 5k in total which again is not betting related. That £2.66 is the lot for me. I'm all sold out.

Wish me luck, and thanks.
Contrast the two quotes “I’ve had a bad few months overall on Betfair” with “I’ve not been losing recently”. Eh?

While I have not had my account as low as £2.66, I was at one time down to £21.40 from an initial, and to date only, deposit of £98.50, so I do have some knowledge of working with a small bank. It can be done. The difference though is that while my account was a hobby, and I had the time to experiment and find what worked with no pressure, John thinks that he can generate an income from his balance just like that. Well, good luck with that idea.

A golden rule of gambling is never to bet with money that you can't afford to lose. Scared money (fear) leads to poor decisions. Your mind has to be clear, alcohol free, and well rested too, although the rest thing to me simply means a good night’s sleep. A two week holiday to recharge your batteries is overkill – from a trading perspective, it’s as useful as charging your mobile for two weeks.

If you're distracted by outside factors, you're not going to succeed in this game.

I’ve made plenty of errors, but that’s acceptable if you learn from them. As John F Kennedy said “An error does not become a mistake until you refuse to correct it”.

Alcohol? Lost £1,317.82 on 31st August 2006.

Distracted? Lost £3,148.76 on 25th July, 2006.

Tired? Lost £5,183.31 on 1st January, 2007.

Chasing? Lost £2,841.59 on 4th January, 2007.

Ouch, but lessons learned.

John does have it right when he says “There is big money to be made here as well” because there is. The problem is that everyone else is after it too, and you need to be patient and disciplined in the struggle for it.

And, of course, well hydrated!

Monday, 6 June 2011

Kelly And The Strong Draw


A final look at the Strong Draw results for 2011, specifically a look at how Kelly would have fared as a staking system.

While Kelly would have indeed have increased the ROI to 63.9% (versus 19.5% at level stakes), the volatility of Kelly makes this a rather meaningless comparison. Had the final selection of the season been a loss rather than a win, the ROI would have been just 6.6%, a reflection of the huge 3.85 that was available on this game.

Working with a starting bank of £1,000, the biggest draw-down would have been £110.82, and the average stake would have been £98.91, with a high of £175.11 and a minimum of £40.16.

Half-Kelly would have resulted in an ROI of 49.75%, with a draw-down of £39.80, an average stake of £48.37, with a high of £85.96 and a minimum of £19.82.

These numbers are for illustrative purposes only since, in practice, some games are played simultaneously and I have also made no adjustments for commission charges.

Sunday, 5 June 2011

NOBs And Buttocks


It's not usually part of my investment strategy to bet on Argentinian football, but occasionally in a good week, I'll have a bet or two as part of the Premium Charge reduction strategy. 

My bet on Newell's Old Boys (classy fans above, fresh from filming TOWIE) last night was voided, apparently due to crowd trouble, including an incident when two Newell's fans on a motorcycle opened fire with guns (it is unclear what the ratio of shots to shots on target was) and wounded a Rosario police force commander. Without meaning to trivialise the fact that a person has been shot, it is frustrating that it will be costing me money. Do these people not think about how far-reaching their actions are?

Saturday was not a good day. Looking for some 50/50 shots, I seemed to pick the wrong one with remarkable consistency emphasising again that for me at least, value is a lot easier to find in-play than it is pre-game. I picked a bad time to start following the MLB Daily Picks as they are now negative with a current losing run of 4, and 6 losses in the last 7 selections.

Game 3 of the NBA Finals starts in a little over an hour, and if either team has a double digit lead in the fourth quarter, lay them at 1.02. Twice in the last three play-off games, a team has come back to win from the dead, and Dallas, who achieved this last week in Miami at the American Airlines Arena, now have the momentum in the series and can win out in Dallas at the American Airlines Center with the 2-3-2 format now in use. A 2-3-2 final series has been tied at 1-1 eleven times, and the winner of game three has gone on to win all eleven series. Miami are still favourites at 1.72, hardly surprising with Le Bron James, Dwayne Wade and Chris Bosh, but Dallas are resilient and that 1.72 looks a value lay to me.

Lest anyone think my comment on the shot policeman be in poor taste, the victim was shot in the buttocks, in no serious danger and will survive. Similarly, my account will receive another kick in the arse next week, but will also survive.

Saturday, 4 June 2011

Janus


The European football season is now in the books, and the screenshot above shows the final strike rates for the Strong Draw system across all leagues individually and in total. Ligue 1 (37%) finished slightly ahead of the Bundesliga (37%), with the EPL (36%) close behind in third. La Liga (33%) and Serie A (31%) were the 'worst' of the leagues. It is a very selective system, with just 157 picks over the season, and the 55 winners means a strike rate of 35%.

I monitored the selections that fell just short of the 'Strong' rating, and while their inclusion did slightly reduce the strike rate overall, it wasn't by a huge amount, and the extra bets (50) would have boosted the bottom line. The results with these included is shown below in yellow:
As I mentioned before, I only started keeping an accurate record of the prices in 2011, where the average price was 3.44, an implied probability of 0.291. Only La Liga fell below this number when the 'weaker' draws were included - disappointing, but with just 9 selections, hardly anything to worry about.

With the Spanish play-offs not concluding until June 19th, I have a few days to decide how to merge the promoted teams into the spreadsheet. It will probably be along the lines of assigning promoted teams the average for the bottom half of the league (excluding relegated teams) with a small adjustment based on finishing position, e.g. QPR will start the season with slightly more points than Norwich City and Swansea City. Assigning the league average is too generous - the gulf between the top league and the second tier appears as great in France, Germany, Italy and Spain as it is in England with at least one promoted team going straight back down in each country.

Friday, 3 June 2011

Always Learning


The always respectful Mr. Nordsted posted a comment on my last post which oddly didn't show on the blog, but, perhaps to compensate, appeared in my in-box twice. It's worth a read, with some advice on the importance of staking correctly.

Once again congratulations on your most informative blog. Just a quick word on a number of points. This years Drawmaster did not go as well as last year where I made 30 points profit and you are right this season I did these selections for goal.com and it was part of the preview I would do 3 matches so if one came in you were in profit and the readers seemed to enjoy this although I certainly believe being a little more selective would have produced a bigger profit. All I can say is the 3 selections I picked every week were the 3 best rated for that weekend and I never strayed from that course.

As regards the baseball my colleague is doing OK and hopefully he will be able to return a good profit by the end of the season. I am pleased with way the opposing the home favourite with a negative rating has gone and this is showing a profit of just over 18 points in 110 bets which equates to a 16.54 Return on Investment. I will ensure a ratings result table goes up on the site very soon.

As I've said before I do not know one end of a baseball bat from another so it will be interesting to see where this goes and it is interesting to note your comments on when the strong home favourites start turning it on. The only thing I would say to anybody considering following these ratings is please be aware as you will soon see by the table losing and winning runs can be streaky and a long losing run can play tricks on the mind and havoc with your bank if you are not used to betting like this. So please make sure you are always correctly capitalised keep the stakes low and understand you can have a substantial drawdown and also please be aware that at this moment in time we are just experimenting here although initially the results do look promising.

All the best and keep up the good work with the blog.
My comment on Pete handicapping himself wasn't intended as a criticism of the selection method, only that by his commitment to goal.com to produce three picks a week, he was making things harder for himself than they are for those of us who have a little more freedom. An ROI over a season of 13% is an excellent outcome to my mind.

Mark had a quick question on the Premium Charge
have you worked out how much you need to lose each week to avoid the PC based on your average weekly win and commission rate?
and the answer is yes, I need to lose 1p a week (or more) to avoid the charge.

Being a little more serious, if I have understood the question correctly, the proper answer is that in an average week, I would need to add about £6,000 in winnings and £6,000 in losses to generate enough commission to stay under the radar. My points discount right now is 22%, but that will fall away during the summer, as will my 'average' weekly profit. I need to grow some bigger balls and put more money on the line at borderline, or even slightly negative value, but it goes against my nature. I've written before how betting thousands in-play is not a problem but more than a couple of hundred on a punt makes me a little nervous. I'm working on it.

Finally, a story to highlight the importance of reading the rules properly before venturing into new markets. It concerns baseball, and Betfair have this season introduced a "5 Innings Moneyline" market -
Which team will be ahead after 5 innings have been completed? For bets to stand there must be 5 full innings of play unless the home team is leading after 4½ innings.
There is no half-time in baseball, but this market seemed close enough, but unlike other half-time markets where "dead-heat rules" apply, this market, for some odd reason, states that ***THIS MARKET WILL BE VOID IF THE SCORES ARE TIED AFTER 5 INNINGS***. Never mind that the rule is posted as written - with loud asterisks and shouty uppercase. One idiot, who shall remain nameless, didn't notice or read it, and was all over a back at 1.1 in a game tied in the middle of the fifth. When more money appeared, almost begging to be taken, it dawned on our nameless friend that perhaps, not for the first time in his (or her) life, he (or she) was missing something. Dead-heat rules did NOT apply, so in this situation a back of 1.001 was value, never mind 1.1. Fortunately for our simpleton friend, the bottom half of the fifth innings saw no runs scored, (although a runner on base with no outs ensured that a change of underwear was required), and he (or she) a-'void'-ed a small disaster. I bet he (or she) felt pretty silly though. I know I would, - if it were me. Which it obviously wasn't.